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INTRODUCTION
The obstacles for women's full and equal incorporation in the labor
market due to familial care obligations have been at the center of public
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attention in many developed and developing countries. Attempts to more
fully and equally incorporate women in the labor market brought with
them lively public discussion and disagreements around what women's
equal access to the labor market should look like. These debates demon-
strated the complexity of optimally tailoring such policies to promote the
variety of desirable normative goals underpinning mechanisms of social
justice. Taking this complexity and normative variability into account,
this Article focuses on designing welfare and tax mechanisms for the
promotion of women in the family and the market.
Policy debates in the area often appear to be limited in the choices
of available mechanisms they consider in order to promote women in
general, and working parents of young children (usually mothers) in par-
ticular. Traditionally, policymakers frame their respective initiatives
around the classic dichotomy of government versus market: should the
government allocate more resources for the provision of social services,
or would such resource allocation impose too large a burden on the pub-
lic fisc and should thus be left for people's own resources and individual
choices. In other words, the debate is often framed around two presuma-
bly opposing options: either public or private provision of social ser-
vices. For example, in the context of childcare, the main question often
revolves around whether the government should provide or subsidize
childcare or not,1 and whether choices regarding childcare should be left
for the family that will choose to provide the care itself or purchase their
desired level and form of care in the market.
This Article suggests that tax and welfare policies that promote gen-
der equality require creative thinking about the design of social mecha-
nisms for the promotion of women. It offers a framework for expanding
the institutional imagination in order to recalibrate welfare state reforms
to promote women. In particular, we advocate the creative use of legal
tools and doctrine to dismantle existing dichotomies between private and
public, understand the various goals different mechanisms can serve and
reassemble them to promote different mixes of normative goals. We pro-
pose doing so by looking simultaneously at two fields of redistribution:
welfare state benefits and services on the one hand and income taxation
on the other. These two fields serve similar goals and accordingly, we
argue, should be analyzed in light of the same policy considerations and
normative underpinnings. Since the goals of these two fields are compa-
rable, the mechanisms that both fields use should also be compatible.
I If the decision is to publically fund childcare an important subset of questions opens
up: From what age? For how many hours? What should be the qualifications of care provid-
ers? Are they public employees? How regulated and uniform should early education programs
be, if at all, etc.? Yet the preliminary question is often posited in the dichotomous public vs.
private form.
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Our unified analysis of welfare and tax offers three contributions to
existing scholarship. These contributions correspond to the stages of our
analysis: In Part I, we ground our analysis in an explicit and multifaceted
discussion of the normative considerations that underlie tax and welfare
policies: namely, efficiency; distributive justice (including gender equal-
ity); and autonomy (including personhood and community). We offer a
rich account of each of these normative considerations and its indispens-
ability as a component of a comprehensive policy. We believe that such
an account is a crucial starting point for tax and welfare policy design for
the promotion of gender equality. In Part II, we outline the wide variety
of policy tools on the spectrum between pure market-based policies and
strictly state-provided benefits. Breaking the strict dichotomy between
private and public allows us to consider policies and mechanisms that
use the institutional benefits of both worlds. Accordingly, we are not
focused on the characterization of the various arrangements as "public"
or "private" and "state" or "market", but rather, we look more closely at
the various features of the numerous arrangements, asking what purposes
they serve and what opportunities they provide.
In Part III, we provide an analytical framework as a roadmap for
mechanism design that we believe is helpful in evaluating the normative
goals certain types of mechanisms can provide. In order to further relax
the strict state-market dichotomy so as to enable creative thinking about
more nuanced possible institutional options, we build on existing litera-
ture to offer a typology of policy solutions along five mechanism-design
criteria: universal vs. selective, income dependent vs. fixed sum, in kind
services vs. cash transfers, who provides the service (the state, the family
or the market) and whether and how the policy seeks to affect intra-
household division of labor. We go beyond the state-market distinction
in order to model the complex implications, risks, and potential advan-
tages of such seemingly technical criteria, and explain the unique mix of
normative goals supported by each of them.
Finally, in Part IV, we explore how the core normative values of
efficiency, distribution and autonomy are being served by the different
mechanism-design criteria, and how by moving slightly along the various
scales, and through the combination of different policy tools, a variety of
hybrid mechanisms open up, without necessarily subscribing to the tradi-
tional public-private distinction. To demonstrate this, we focus on child-
care, seeking to use the creative potential of hybrid private-public
mechanisms in order to promote the many-sometimes contradicting-
normative goals that coincide in this juncture of family, market and state.
In the discussion in this Article we pay more attention to one of the
normative goals-autonomy, and show how this normative goal would
affect our policy choices using the five mechanism-design criteria. This
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is not to say that autonomy is the most important normative goal, but
only to show the multiplicity of available options and nuances, and how
they unfold through the analytical framework we offer. We more briefly
discuss redistribution and efficiency considerations. A more serious con-
sideration of all is obviously required in order to complete the analysis
and any serious policy recommendation. This will await a separate
articulation.
I. THE NORMATIVE UNDERPINNINGS OF TAX AND WELFARE POLICIES
Tax and welfare policies are traditionally viewed as a vehicle for
distributing the costs and benefits of government in an equitable and effi-
cient manner. Under this canonical description, income tax and welfare
policies aspire to achieve the sometimes conflicting goals of efficiently
maximizing social welfare while promoting distributive justice.
Efficiency requires that we promote policies that maximize social
welfare by maximizing the benefits and minimizing the costs (adminis-
trative costs as well as changes in the behavior of market actors) of such
policies. In traditional thought, efficiency was understood as minimizing
the interference of the tax and transfer system with the free market-that
is, ensuring that the economy operates as it would in the absence of
taxes.2 Under this view, the free market (in the absence of market fail-
ures) maximizes the wellbeing of its participants. The "wedge" that taxes
and transfer payments create between the price paid by the consumer and
the price received by the producer interferes with the efficiency of the
free market. 3 An efficient tax raises revenues and an efficient allowance
provides goods and services while minimizing "deadweight losses" (i.e.,
the costs of distorting economic decisions). When some activities are
taxed more heavily than others, taxpayers are incentivized to avoid heav-
ily-taxed activities in favor of relatively untaxed ones that they would
otherwise value less; and when a certain good and service is heavily sub-
sidized, consumers will be drawn to it despite their original preferences. 4
Thus, a central goal of tax reform is often the avoidance of arbitrary
differences in tax rates across different types of activities, consumption
and investment, which helps to reduce distortions of decisions about
what to consume and how to produce it.5 On welfare policy, as well -all
2 See, e.g., JOEL SLEMROD & JON BAKIJA, TAXING OURSELVES: A CrnIZEN's GUIDE TO
THE DEBATE OVER TAXES 120 (4th ed. 2008).
3 Id. ("This outcome maximizes the well-being of participants in the market in the nar-
row sense of maximizing the amount by which total dollar-valued benefits exceed total dollar-
valued costs, a situation economists describe as 'efficient.' ").
4 See id.
5 Id. The more recent approach of optimal taxation prescribes that it is desirable to tax
more heavily those goods for which demand (and supply) is relatively price insensitive. Thus,
in recent years, optimal taxation has been suggested as a way to design a more efficient tax
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other things being equal-it is preferable to provide social welfare with
the least economic costs. Thus, in the provision of subsidies, we would
probably try not to distort the decisions of welfare recipients to engage in
certain activities (e.g., find a job, purchase a car) or consume certain
goods (e.g., prefer subsidized bread to unsubsidized oranges or select a
specific type of childcare). Of course, saving on the administrative costs
involved in collecting the revenues and providing the public goods and
services is a factor, as the lower such costs, the more efficient our tax and
welfare system is. Hence, an efficient welfare system would strive to
minimize the costs involved in providing such benefits and to ensure that
such benefits reach the ones that could make the best use of them.
As significant as it is, efficiency is not the only goal of desirable
public policy. Rather, citizens' taxes, as well as the public goods and
benefits provided by the state's welfare apparatus, are expected to pro-
mote distributive justice.6 Identifying the precise prescriptions of justice
in the context of tax and transfer is a question (too broad to be compre-
hensively addressed here)7 that both entails normative considerations and
system. See Joseph Bankman & Thomas Griffith, Social Welfare and the Rate Structure: A
New Look at Progressive Taxation, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1905, 1945 (1987); Edward J. McCaffery,
Tax's Empire, 85 GEO. L.J. 71, 106 (1996); David A. Weisbach, Line Drawing, Doctrine, and
Efficiency in the Tax Law, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1627, 1655-56 (1999). But despite the theoret-
ical appeal of optimal taxation, it is not a particularly useful guide for tax policy in practice. It
employs differential tax rates (with the highest rates imposed on necessities) and-given the
uncertainty as to which goods have relatively price-elastic demand-is susceptible to pressure
from special interest groups. See SLEMROD & BAKIJA supra note 2, at 132.
6 See e.g., HENRY SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION: THE DEFINITION OF INCOME
AS A PROBLEM OF FISCAL POLICY 18-19 (1938) "("The case for drastic progression in taxa-
tion ... must be rested on the case against inequality on the ethical or aesthetic judgment that
the prevailing distribution of wealth and income reveals a degree (and/or kind) of inequality
which is distinctly evil or unlovely"); LIAM MURPHY & THOMAS NAGEL, THE MYTH OF OWN-
ERSHIP 12 (2002); MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & DEBORAH H. SCHENK, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION:
PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 25-27 (4th ed. 2002); Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Three Goals of
Taxation, 60 TAX L. REv. 1, 12 (2006-2007). For examples of the discussion of distributive
justice in recent academic literature, see Linda Sugin, Theories of Distributive Justice and
Limitations on Taxation: What Rawls Demands from Tax Systems, 72 FORDHAM L. REv. 1991
(2004); Brian Galle, Tax Fairness 65 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1323, 1323 (2008); Barbara H.
Fried, The Puzzling Case for Proportionate Taxation, 2 CHAP. L. REV. 157, 195 (1999). For a
review of the political history of taxing the rich, see Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Why Tax the Rich?
Efficiency, Equity, and Progressive Taxation, 111 YALE L.J. 1391, 1413-16 (2002) (calling for
a new balance between equity and efficiency analysis in tax policy); J.J. Thorndike & D.J.
Ventry, Tax Justice: The Ongoing Debate. Washington, D.C.: Urban Institute Press; 2002, at
30. For the competing goals and their relations in different welfare states see: Robert E.
Goodin, Bruce Headey, Ruud Muffels, & Hank-Jan Dirven, Reasons for Welfare, in THE REAL
WORLDS OF WELFARE CAPITALISM, 21-36 (1999); Gosta Esping-Andersen, After the Golden
Age? Welfare State Dilemmas in a Global Economy in Gosta Esping-Andersen ed. WELFARE
STATES IN TRANSITION: NATIONAL ADAPTATIONS IN GLOBAL ECONOMIES 1, 24-25 (1996).
7 MURPHY & NAGEL, supra note 6, at 73 ("The values that bear on the assessment of
public policy are very diverse, so there is much to disagree about. First, there are questions
about the legitimate ends of public policy-whether they should be defined by collective self-
interest, or the general welfare, or some conception of fairness, including equal opportunity...
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requires political deliberation. For the purposes of this Article, however,
it suffices to note that both taxation and entitlement to public goods
should be based on some function of social justice. In traditional tax and
welfare literature, distributive justice is often understood as focused on,
and measured by material wellbeing-attempting to mitigate the material
gaps between members of the community by collecting progressive taxa-
tion which is based on taxpayers' ability to pay8 and providing benefits
based on either a universal basis or on some particular need-based crite-
ria-thus redistriuting income among members of the community. Both
the tax base (distribution of what)9 and the tax rates (how much distribu-
tion) 10 and certainly the size and nature of the goods and services that
Second, there are questions about the limits on the authority of the state over the individual,
and whether property rights have any part in defining those limits, or whether they are mere
conventions designed for other purposes. Third, there are questions about the proper role of
responsibility and desert in the determination of people's economic rewards-and about what
individuals can and cannot be held responsible for. Fourth, there are questions about the im-
portance of equality of opportunity, and its relation to inherited economic inequality-and the
broader question of what social causes of distributive inequality should be regarded as offen-
sively arbitrary. Finally, there are questions about the importance of freedom of choice in
economic life.").
8 ADAM SuTH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS, 347 (1937) ("The subjects of every state
ought to contribute to the support of the government, as nearly as possible in proportion to
their respective abilities: that is, in proportion to the revenue which they respectively enjoy
under the protection of the state.") Though the exact meaning of ability to pay is vague and
debatable, it nonetheless reflects the notion that taxpayers should pay their fair share in financ-
ing the public fisc (which according to Mill translates to "equal sacrifice" see JOHN STUART
MILL, THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY WITH SOME OF THEm APPLICATIONS To So-
CIAL PHILOSOPHY 485 (1866) (".... all are thought to have done their part fairly when each has
contributed according to his means, that is has made an equal sacrifice for the common ob-
ject.") (emphasis added).
9 There are numerous interpretations of what constitutes equal distribution in this con-
text. Material wellbeing is certainly part of one's ability, however, distribution does not and
should not focus on material wellbeing alone. Attributes such as health, physical state, family
status, gender, prestige, quality of living, and level of education do not necessarily translate
into material differences, yet they certainly affect people's wellbeing. See AMARTYA SEN, INE-
QUALITY REEXAMINED 150 (1992); McCaffery, supra note 5, at 106 ("But modem tax systems
go well beyond affecting the distribution of money. A consistent limitation of the utilitarian
turn in tax theory, as we have seen above, has been to reduce questions of taxation to a single
index of resources in a narrowly framed problem of distributive justice. But even if tax were
only ever intended to be about such matters, all practical means of seeking distributive jus-
tice transcend the single index of wealth, to affect patterns of work, marriage, family, educa-
tion, savings, investment, charity, and so on. Behaviors, lifestyles, family models, and various
market actions are inevitably at stake."). MURPHY & NAGEL, supra note 6, at 57 ("Apart from
these very broad questions of social justice, which obviously bear on the way tax policy should
relate to inequalities of wealth, disposable income, consumption, and earning power, the aim
of avoiding arbitrary sources of inequality can have an influence on the more detailed design
of public policy. In relation to taxes, it manifests itself in controversies over the fairness of
differential tax treatment of persons with distinguishing characteristics who are in other ways
economically comparable. The question arises with respect to savers and spenders, the married
and the unmarried, people with children and people without, and so forth.").
10 For the case for and against progressive taxation, see Avi-Yonah, supra note 6, at
1399-1410.
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should be provided by the state are debatable in terms of tax and welfare
justice."1 However, there is no question that tax policy and the welfare
state are key venues for advancing justice,12 and that tax and welfare are
key tools (the optimal tool, some even argue)1 3 for achieving distributive
justice.
Redistribution, in order to improve and somewhat equalize citizens'
material wellbeing, is therefore highly important and is seen by some as
the main goal of both taxation and spending regimes. Yet, tax and wel-
fare systems affect the distribution not only of wealth but also of social
currency such as notions of contribution (e.g., which activities are con-
sidered productive (labor) and which are not (housework)), dignity (e.g.,
by requiring invasive tests in order to collect certain welfare benefits),
power, time, dependency (e.g., by incentivizing family care over state
owned facilities) and even intra-household division of labor (e.g. by rein-
forcing traditional gender roles in relation to familial care through pro-
viding maternal leave (rather than parental leave) or disallowing the costs
of childcare thus incentivizing imputed income of self-provided childcare
which-in a tilted labor market-often incentivizes mothers to stay at
home). 14 Our proposed framework encompasses material and non-mate-
rial goods distributed by tax and welfare policies. This approach adopts
the feminist critique according to which traditional cost-benefit analysis
of social policy design disregards aspects of public policy that effect wo-
men's choices.' 5 Specifically, we argue that the way tax and welfare pol-
icy distributes these non-material elements is an important criteria that
should be taken into account in the evaluation of any social policy.
Beyond efficiency and distributive justice, tax and welfare policies
have a particularly significant effect on citizens' liberty and their auton-
omy. Tax levels burden taxpayers' ability to freely conduct their busi-
ness, and benefits financed through taxation often empower their
11 For a classic articulation of the different forms welfare states take, the different goods
and services they provide, and the different distributive outcomes varying institutional struc-
tures reach, see G0STA ESPING-ANDERSEN, THE THREE WORLDS OF WELFARE CAPrrALIsM
9-35 (1990).
12 Cf Thomas Nagel, The Problem of Global Justice, 33 PinM. & PUB. AFFAIRS 113, 130
(2005) ("[tlhe state makes unique demands on the will of its members.. .and those exceptional
demands bring with them exceptional obligations, the positive obligations of justice.").
13 See, e.g., Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Why the Legal System Is Less Efficient than
the Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 667 (1994).
14 For a demonstration of this argument see e.g., Tsilly Dagan, Ordinary People, Neces-
sary Choices: A Comparative Study of Childcare Deductions 11 THEORETIcAL INQUIRES IN
LAW 588 (2010).
15 Rebecca M. Blank, What Should Mainstream Economists Learn From Feminist The-
ory?, in BEYOND EcoNoMIc MAN: FEMINIST THEORY AND EcONOMICS 133 (Marianne A. Fer-
ber & Julie A. Nelson eds., 1993); Myra H. Strober, Can Feminist Thought Improve
Economics? Rethinking Economics Through a Feminist Lens, AM. ECON. REv., 143 (May
1994).
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beneficiaries who?, absent public support, might have been unable to
freely participate in social lives. 16 The involvement of money (in taxes as
well as subsidies) often commodifies interactions, pushing taxpayers as
well as welfare recipients to evaluate otherwise incommensurable goods
in term of their use value. 17 Less intuitive, perhaps, are the ways in
which tax and welfare policies affect citizens' functions in various con-
texts: their perception of their own identity, as well as their family, com-
munity and social interactions.' 8 In particular, we argue that tax and
welfare policies are powerful social instruments that participate in the
construction of choices available for people. They affect-and often
limit-the ways in which people perceive themselves and influence the
way in which people interact with others. When, for example, such poli-
cies acknowledge some differences (e.g., ability to pay, productivity,
one's marital status, availability of familial resources, "business" ex-
penses) while ignoring others (e.g., one's disability, her living with a
partner, her place of residency, her level of education, her childcare ex-
penses, her level of skill or professional interests) they reinforce a certain
conception of an "ideal-type citizen" and undermine alternative under-
standings of productivity, value, independence, and entitlement. If we
assume an ideal-type citizen to be healthy, married, childless (or child-
care free), working full time, or living near her workplace, we exclude
those who are disabled, single, and have children (or familial care re-
sponsibilities), are unable to find long-term stable jobs, or are living
away from their (potential) workplaces. These assumptions are not
merely expressive. They obviously entail real-life incentives and conse-
quences. 19 Moreover, they often detach interactions from the original
context (e.g., governmentally instead of family provided childcare dis-
connects care from its familial setting). Tax and welfare policies may
thus affect not only people's perception of themselves and of others but
also their choices (to go out to work, rely on family or on state support,
to live away from work, etc.). Assuming enough people change their
choices because of such policies, social meanings and norms may
16 Katharine G. Young, The Minimum Core of Economic and Social Rights: A Concept
in Search of Content, 33 YALE J. INT'L L. 113, 128-130, (2008).
17 See e.g., Tsilly Dagan, The Currency of Taxation, 84 Fordham Law Review 2537,
2542-2547, (2016).
18 see generally Tsilly Dagan, The Currency of Taxation, 84 Fordham Law Review 2537
19 Thus, for example, the inclusion of an item (e.g., imputed income) in the tax base
increases liability (and provides disincentives for self-provision of services); allowing an item
(e.g., the costs of childcare) as a deduction reduces liability (and increases incentives to hire
childcare). The way certain incorporations (e.g., nonprofit) are taxed impacts their desirability
by either increasing or decreasing the incentive for charitable associations and contributions.
With increased incentives, more people may select to outsource services, place their children
in childcare, or get involved in charities, thereby affecting social norms and, again, identities.
See id. At 2540-41.
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change. Thus, for example, the allowance of market-based childcare may
commodify the parent-child interaction.20 As a result, tax and welfare
policies may affect the ways in which citizens (as taxpayers, workers,
and welfare recipients) function within their communities, families, and
workplaces. Moreover, the make, size and nature of the communities that
people form and the social institutions that they construct may change-
and with them the options available for people to pursue.
The normative goals we outline-autonomy, efficiency, and distrib-
utive justice-may be in tension with each other, and thus-as we shall
later explain-call for different legal mechanisms. Moreover, different
conceptualization of a single normative goal may push towards different
policy proposals. Before we turn to that, however, we would like to more
closely consider, and critically evaluate, a dichotomous pattern that
dominates tax and welfare policy debates-the question of public vs. pri-
vate responsibility and the division of labor between two seemingly op-
posing institutions-the state and the market.
II. BETWEEN THE STATE AND THE MARKET
Traditionally, the categories of the "private" market and the "pub-
lic" state were conceived as two distinct and separate spheres. Under this
view, actors, actions, and resources were regarded as either public or
private, conducted either in the realm of the state or the market.2 1 Subse-
quently, each sphere was regarded as a realm with a distinct institutional
logic and disparate attributes: the market as the efficient provider of ser-
vices, and promoter of autonomy due to the variety of options it offers; 22
the state, as the institution that inherently is more attune to distributive
20 By commodification in this context we mean detaching interactions and aspects of life
from their original-in this case familial-context and transferring them to the realms of the
state or market.
21 For a small sample of the vast array of literature on the Private/Public dichotomy see
Symposium, The Public/Private Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1289 (1982); Symposium,
Mediating Institutions: Beyond the Public/Private Distinction, 61 U. CHI. L. Rav. 1213
(1994); Symposium, The Boundaries of Public Law, 11 INT'L J. CONST. L. 125 (2013); Sym-
posium, Public/Private Beyond Distinctions?, 15 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 1 (2013); There
are also countless individual books and articles. See for example PAUL FAIRFIELD, PUBLIC/
PRIVATE (2005); MARTHA MNOw, PARTNERS NOT RIVALS: PRIVATIZATION AND THE PUBLIC
GooD (2002); PUBLIC AND PRIVATE IN THOUGHT AND PRACTICE: PERSPECTIVES ON A GRAND
DICHOTOMY (Jeff Weintraub & Krishan Kumar eds., 1997); PUBLIC AND PRIVATE IN SOCIAL
LIFE (S.I. Benn & G.F. Gaus eds., 1983); Christine Chinkin, A Critique of the Public/Private
Dimension, 10 EUR. J. INT'L L. 387 (1999); Alan Freeman & Elizabeth Mensch, The Public-
Private Distinction in American Law and Life, 36 BUFF. L. REV. 237 (1987); Paul M.
Schoenhard, A Three-Dimensional Approach to the Public-Private Distinction, 2008 UTAH L.
REV. 635; and Development in the Law-State Action and Public/Private Distinction, 123
HARv. L. REV. 1248 (2009-2010).
22 Tsilly Dagan & Talia Fisher, Rights for Sale, 96 MINN. L. REV. 90, 96 (2011).
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justice, and the promotor of democratic values.23 Examples of such
views can be found in the discussion about the merits and shortcomings
of privatization, specifically in the cases of prisons and hospitals.
24
However, the dichotomous take on the private-public division has
been challenged in the past decades, and has been questioned to a consid-
erable extent. 25 Are public and private really opposing spheres of gov-
ernance? Questioning voices, such as that of Ralf Michaels, argue that
we should re-consider this dichotomy:
Do we not care more about good versus bad governance
than we care about state versus non-state governance?
And if we do, is the difference state/non-state or the dif-
ference public/private really the prime criterion by which
to assess governance?... Instead of the formal and arti-
ficial differentiation state/non-state, we should look for
functional differentiations between different modes of
governance. 26
We agree. We see public and private not as opposing rival institu-
tions which demand an either-or selection, but rather as offering a wide
array of different possible combinations in which private and public fea-
tures and mechanisms are combined to recreate public-private hybrids
that are neither purely public nor exclusively private. Examples of such
public-private hybrids abound: there are more and more 'public' pro-
grams that function "through the use of agencies, privatized contractors,
public-private partnerships, and the creation of markets and quasi-mar-
kets in public services," 27 and increasingly, more private operations that
are backed up by public funding and governed by governmental regula-
tion,28 as governments have been "endowing groups of private actors
23 JANET NEWMAN & JOHN CLARKE PUBLICS, POLITICS AND POWER: REMAKING THE PUB-
LIC IN PUBLIC SERVICES 5 (2009).
24 For a discussion and critique of the classic arguments made regarding privatization of
prisons, see Hadar Aviram, Are Private Prisons to Blame for Mass Incarceration and Its Evils:
Prison Conditions, Neoliberalism, and Public Choice, 42 Fordham Urb. L.J. 411 (2014). For an
analysis of the discussion regarding the privatization of hospitals, see Jeffrey Braithwaite,
Joanna F. Travaglia & Angus Corbett, Can Questions of the Privatization and Corporatization,
and the Autonomy and Accountability of Public Hospitals, Ever be Resolved? 19 HEALTH
CARE ANAL. 13 (2011).
25 Duncan Kenney, The Stages of the Decline of the Public/Private Distinction 130 U.
Pa. L. Rev. (1982); Joseph W. Singer, Legal Realism Now, 76 CALIF. L. REv. 465, 482-87
(1988). For a recent account of the Private/Public dichotomy in a neo-liberal age see: Hila
Shamir, The Public/Private Distinction Now: The Challenges of Privatization and of the Regu-
latory State 15 THEOR. INQ. L. 1-26 (2014).
26 Ralf Michaels, The Mirage of Non-State Governance, UTAH L. REv. 31, 33 (2010).
27 Newman & Clarke, supra note 23, at 3.
28 MARIANA MAZZUCATO, THE ENTREPRENEURIAL STATE: DEBUNKING PUBLIC VS. PRI-
VATE SECTOR MYTHS 2 (2013).
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with public powers. '29 Substantial private-public cooperation creates a
public-private mix in practically all areas of public life, including provi-
sion of security, 30 public health, food safety, 31 pollution control, 32 and
historically-the internet, 33 to name a few. Indeed, increasingly in order
to understand the changing regulatory landscape we need to pay attention
to cooperation and dependency between the state (through its regulation
and provision of access to resources) and the market (through its funding
and ability to accommodate itself to different projects).
Thus, public and private need be examined not as two distinct
spheres, but rather as elements that configured in various hybrids and
combinations. We see this flexibility as a potential opportunity to let go
of myths of "free" markets and "fair" states in order to create policies
and mechanisms that use the institutional benefits of both. Accordingly,
we are not focused on the characterization of the various arrangements as
public or private and state or market, but rather, we look more closely at
the various features of the numerous arrangements, asking what purposes
they serve and what opportunities they provide.
We focus, in Part IV, on the context of childcare, looking for new
and creative ways to support working parents in balancing the challenges
of childcare and careers within their households, if they seek to achieve
spousal equality. We seek to use the creative potential of such hybrid
private-public mechanisms in order to design mechanisms that would be
able to promote the many-sometimes contradicting-normative goals
that coincide in this juncture of family, market and state. At times this
will require hard choices between competing goals, at others it might not.
Below we provide an analytical framework that can help is systemically
evaluating the costs and benefits of different mechanisms and ties to-
gether mechanism design criteria with the normative goals different
types of mechanisms can promote.
29 Thomas Sikor, Eva Barlosius, and Waltine Scheumann. Introduction: Public-Private
Relations and Key Policy Issues in Natural Resource Governance in Thomas Sikor ed., PUBLIC
AND PRIVATE IN NATURAL RESOURCE GOVERNANCE: A FALSE DICHOTOMY? 1 (2008). See also
Martha Minow & Jody Freeman, Introduction: Refraining the Outsourcing Debates in Martha
Minow & Jody Freeman eds. GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT: OUTSOURCING AN AMERICAN DE-
MOCRACY 1-20 (2009).
30 DEBORAH D. AvANT, THE MARKET FOR FORCE: THE CONSEQUENCES OF PRIVATIZING
SECURITY (2005).
31 Julie Guthman, The Polanyian Way? Voluntary Food Labels as Neoliberal Govern-
ance, 39 ANTIPODE 456-478 (2007); Ching-Fu Lin, Public-Private Interactions in Global
Food Safety Governance, FOOD & DRUG L.J. 143, 160 (2014).
32 Tom Tietenberg The Tradable Permits Approach to Protecting the Commons: What
Have We Learned?, in: THE DRAMA OF THE COMMONS (Elinor Ostrom, Thomas Dietz, Nives
Nives Dolgak, Paul C. Stem, Susan Stonich, and Elke U. Weber eds.) 197-232 (2002).
33 See MAZZUCATO, supra note 28, at 110-111.
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III. TRANSLATING NORMATIVE GOALS INTO LEGAL MECHANISMS
The private/public characteristic of any given mechanism is often
perceived-as discussed in the previous Part-as a key element in its
design. We suggest that instead of looking at the institution providing the
service we should be attentive to a series of mechanism design criteria
can help us decipher more closely the relationship between the normative
goals and the chosen mechanism. A key question in policy design is how
to translate normative goals into policies that manage to promote these
goals, even as they encounter the complexities of bureaucratic implemen-
tation,34 are used by "bad men" who will seek ways to evade the law and
its consequences, 35 and confront other factors that may lead to unin-
tended consequences. 36 This is what we seek, in a highly-stylized man-
ner, to achieve here. A distinguishing factor for us in discussing the
normative and distributive goals of a given policy is not whether the state
or the market are the key institutions providing the benefit, but rather a
different set of questions that look at the nature of the benefit or service
provided, and its eventual consequences. We are interested in the distrib-
utive, efficiency and autonomy outcomes of the policy designed rather
than whether it has a state or non-state character. However, leaving the
state/non-state as a main criterion does not mean we offer no criteria at
all. Based on the two previous sections, this section develops institutional
criteria that can assist in the process of policy design of legal mecha-
nisms for the promotion of gender equality in the fields of welfare and
tax law/ and build a framework to evaluate the distributive consequences
of various institutional public-private mixes.
To methodically decipher the different existing policy mechanisms
for the promotion of gender equality and match them with the normative
goals, as well as creatively think about possible institutional options, we
build on existing literature on the theory of the welfare state and taxation
to offer a typology of policy solutions along five mechanism-design cri-
teria. Below we systematically analyze the normative goals advanced by
such different legal mechanisms and explain the different mixes of nor-
mative goals promoted by them. The five criteria we look at are: (1) who
is targeted by the policy (universal vs. selective); (2) in what way the
benefit is provided: in kind or through cash transfer; (3) is the benefit
provided as a fixed sum or is it income dependent; (4) does the benefit
34 See MICHEL CROZIER, THE BUREAUCRATIC PHENOMENON 66 (1964); MICHAEL LIPSKY,
STREET-LEVEL BUREAUCRACY: DILEMMAS OF THE INDIVIDUAL IN PUBLIC SERVICES 13-22
(30th ed., 2010); TONY EVANS, PROFESSIONAL DISCRETION IN WELFARE SERVICES: BEYOND
STREET-LEVEL BUREAUCRACY 39-68 (2016).
35 Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of Law, 110 HARV. L. REV. 994 (1997) (addressing
Boston University of Law January 8, 1897).
36 Richard H. Pildes, The Unintended Cultural Consequences of Public Policy: A Com-
ment on the Symposium. 89 (4) Michigan Law Review, 936-978 (1991).
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effect the traditional (gendered) intra household division of labor
(IHDOL); and (5) finally, we also look at the actor providing the service/
benefit-the state, the market, the family or civil society-and the rela-
tionship between the involved actors, as part of the wider institutional
investigation, but not as a sole determining factor. Under each one of
these criteria, we do not seek to introduce new fictive dichotomies, but
rather to explore the myriad reconfigurations that exist once the dichoto-
mous state of mind is relaxed.
A. Universal vs. Selective
A key element that shapes the consequences and effects of any
given policy is whether the mechanism targets only low income families,
using income tests, or whether it applies universally so that all members
(however defined) of society will be equally entitled to the same treat-
ment regardless of economic need.
Selective benefits may seem like a more efficient way to shift re-
sources to designated individuals and therefore appear to have greater
redistributive potential. Yet, they may suffer from over or under-inclu-
siveness, entail high administrative bureaucratic costs, be subject to the
pressure of political interest groups and thus become more vulnerable to
fiscal cuts, and result in lower quality service or insufficient benefits. 37
Selective benefits may also have a stratifying and stigmatizing effect,
and depending on their specific design, may be highly coercive or pater-
nalistic, particularly so when they are designed as strict or all-or-nothing
categories that may push marginal recipients to pursue behaviors that
will entitle them to the benefits (the best examples are welfare recipients
who decrease their earnings in order to qualify for benefits). 38 Universal
benefits, on the other hand, are seen as expensive and wasteful, but may
prove to be more redistributive when political processes are taken into
account, and better promote social equality, solidarity, and autonomy,
and are easier to administer. 39
Naturally, selectivity and universality are a matter of degree. Thus,
selective benefits can use generous, wide and more inclusive income
37 Walter Korpi & Joakim Palme, The Paradox of Redistribution and Strategies of
Equality: Welfare State Institutions, Inequality, and Poverty in the Western Countries, 63 AM.
Soc. REV., 661, 670-78 (1998); Gillian Lester, Can Joe the Plumber Support Redistribution?
Law, Social Preferences, and Sustainable Policy Design, TAx L. R. 313, 323-25, 328-39
(2010).
38 W. J. H. van Oorschot, Targeting Welfare: On The Functions And Dysfunctions Of
Means-Testing In Social Policy, In P. Townsend, & D. Gorden (eds.), WORLD POVERTY: NEW
PoLicrEs TO DEFEAT AN OLD ENEMY 171, 175-78 (2002).
39 Korpi & Palme, supra note 37, at 681-83; Bo Rothestein, The Future of the Universal
Welfare State, in Stein Kuhnle ed. THE SURVIVAL OF THE EUROPEAN WELFARE STATE 217,
218-24 (2003).
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tests, solving some of the problems associated with them, mostly ones
related to stigma and stratification, and universal benefits can have re-
strictive eligibility criteria and be more selective, thus weakening their
distributive potential.40 In fact, while this dichotomy is often discussed as
a crucial distinguishing characteristic between welfare state regimes, the
social democratic model based on universality and the liberal model
based on selectivity and policy options,41 are better thought of as a spec-
trum in which questions of universality or selectivity are ones of degree,
rather than a different kind of benefit all together.42
B. Fixed-Sum vs. Income-Dependent
In designing tax and welfare benefits, we can select between a fixed
sum mechanism or an income-level dependent mechanism. Each of these
choices may promote different normative goals. Income-dependent bene-
fits can be progressive-the benefit increases as the income decreases-
or regressive-the benefit increases as the income increases. 43 As a re-
sult, income-related benefits can either sustain or increase economic
gaps, or they can mitigate economic gaps. Income-dependent benefits
and taxes can also be more bureaucratically burdensome as they require
reporting of income levels which are not always easily determined They
can also be more intrusive than fixed-sum benefits if they require re-
vealing income levels to public officials or care providers. The latter tend
to be more easily and efficiently administered, and often less intrusive to
a person's privacy and autonomy as they can be provided without requir-
ing any specific information. Here too, the seemingly sharp distinction
between the mechanisms is not inherent. Fixed-sum and income-depen-
dent mechanisms can supplement each other in various ways, such as
adding an income-dependent component to an existing fixed-sum one.
This can be the case, for example, in relation to old age benefits, where a
universal fixed-sum old age benefit can be coupled with an income-de-
pendent pension scheme. 44 This is also the case in the context of child-
care, where a universal children's allowance can be coupled with a tax
deduction for childcare expenses.
40 See van Oorschot, supra note 38, at 175-78.
41 Esping-Andersen, supra note 11, at 26-29.
42 See also Lester, supra note 37, at 323-24.
43 See generally Timothy Besley, The Principles of Targeting, in CURRENT ISSUES IN
DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS (1991); For a more recent review of the literature on the benefits
and costs of universal versus targeted benefits based on income see e.g., David Brady and
Rebekah Burroway, Targeting, Universalism, and Single-Mother Poverty: A Multilevel Analy-
sis Across 18 Affluent Democracies, 49 DEMOGRAPHY 719, 721-24 ((2012). See also Timothy
Besley, Means Testing versus Universal Provision in Poverty Alleviation Programmes, 57
(225) EcONOMICA, NEW SERIES 119-29 (1990).
44 Korpi & Palme call this "an encompassing model," supra note 37, at 669.
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C. Cash Transfers vs. In Kind Services
Benefits can be provided in-kind by the government or can be subsi-
dized or fully funded by cash transfers to individuals. 45 In-kind services
can provide the government some control over the quality and type of
services.46 They can also ensure that public funds will be spent in a con-
trolled and pre-determined manner, leaving recipients less control over
their individual use of the funds as well as over the desired level and type
of service.47 Therefore, in-kind services can better promote equality and
distributive justice, but may-depending on their openness to experimen-
tation and pluralism-be less attuned to citizens' preferences, more pa-
ternalistic, and less respectful of individual autonomy and liberty.4 8 The
criteria in-kind services adhere to, although uniform, may be strict, often
limited, and bureaucratic (and thus frequently reductive).49 In-kind ser-
vices may also be less efficient. Assuming they are not exposed to com-
petition and not focused on profit-making, they may not be designed to
incentivize experimentation, responsiveness and improvement.50
In contrast, cash transfers tend to promote individual autonomy and
choice making capacity. They also may be more efficient if there is a
competitive market for the services that is more diverse and responsive
to individual preferences regarding quality, cost, and nature of the ser-
vice.51 Yet, they can be more commodifying when compared with non-
market care (e.g., within the family) for the services entailed, as they
45 Lester C. Thurow, Government Expenditure: Cash or In Kind Aid? 5 PHmOSOPHY &
PUBLIC AFFAIRS 361-81 (1976); Janet Currie and Firouz Gahvari, Transfers in Cash and In
Kind: Theory Meets the Data, 46(2) JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC LrTERATURE 333, 338-52, 373-76
(2008).
46 Albert Weale, Paternalism and Social Policy, JOURNAL OF SOCIAL POLICY 157-72
(1978).
47 Robert E. Goodin, Freedom and the Welfare State: Theoretical Foundations 11 JouR-
NAL OF SOCIAL POLICY 149-76 (1982).
48 Weale, supra note 46; AMY GUTMAN, LIBERAL EQUALITY 90-91 (1980).
49 Thus, publicly provided care services often follow strict guidelines of "proper" care
(e.g., schedules, dietary preferences, religious rituals and cultural preferences) that are not
flexible enough to adhere to the needs of cared-for individuals.
50 JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY: WHAT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES Do AND WHY
THEY Do IT? 221-32 (1989); though note that public sector innovation is possible and feasible
in an institutional environment that fosters and enables it. See e.g.: MARCO DAGLIO, DANIEL
GERSON, HANNAH KITCHEN, BUILDING ORGANISATIONAL CAPACITY FOR PUBLIC SECTOR INNO-
VATION, Background Paper prepared for the OECD Conference "Innovating the Public Sector:
from Ideas to Impact", Paris, 12-13 November 2014 (2015).
51 MORITZ VON GLISZCZYNSKI, CASH TRANSFERS AND BASIC SOCIAL PROTECTION: To-
WARDS A DEVELOPMENT REVOLUTION? PART 2.1, 28-40 (2015); Jessica Hagen-Zanker, Fran-
cesca Bastagli, Luke Harman, Valentina Barca, Georgina Sturge and Tanja Schmidt,
Understanding the Impact of Cash Transfers: The Evidence, Briefing: Overseas Developing
Institute (2016), available at: https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/resource-documents/
11465.pdf last accessed Jan. 3 2018.
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push service providers and beneficiaries to price-tag their interaction. 52
When comparing state provided in-kind services to market-provided ser-
vices that are subsidized by the state, the commodifying effect is not as
clear. While the money paid for care certainly commodifies the interac-
tion, state-provided care involves no less troubling reductive effects. 53
Cash transfers may also be more deeply stratifying if the cash benefit
(whether selective or universal) does not provide sufficient sums to
purchase quality services. 54
As in the previous two mechanism design criteria, some institutional
configurations fall in between the stark distinction, such as voucher sys-
tems and conditional cash transfers, mixing cash transfers, in different
forms, with in kind services.
D. Shaping Intra Household Division of Labor (IHDOL)
The Intra Household Division of Labor (hereinafter IHDOL) ele-
ment focuses on the effect of policy on male and female contribution to
household work. IHDOL evaluation considers the extent to which the
policy entrenches, transforms, or disrupts the traditional breadwinner/
housewife division of labor in which women are providers of care and
men are breadwinners. 55 The attempt to disrupt traditional gender roles
in the household is a relatively new public policy goal. The leading ex-
amples often given for such policies are the Scandinavian parental leave
programs that incentivize men to take paternal leave by exclusively re-
serving two months of leave for each parent on a take it or leave it ba-
sis.56 There is more experience in various countries with policies
encouraging women to join the paid workforce, and thus often inadver-
tently shift some housework to men. Nonetheless, studies suggest that
this does not necessarily bring with it significant redistribution of house-
52 For an explanation of the commodifying effects of price tagging see e,g, . Tsilly Da-
gan, The State and the Market: A Parable, 3 PUB. REASON 44, 47-51 (2011).
53 Id. at 51.
54 Hagen-Zanker et al., supra note 51, at 4-5.
55 Hila Shamir, The State of Care: Rethinking the Distributive Effects of Familial Care
Policies in Liberal Welfare States, 58 AMERicAN JOURNAL OF COMPAIATIvE LAW 953, 957
(2010); Hila Shamir, Between Home and Work: Assessing the Distributive Effects of Employ-
ment Law in Markets of Care, 30(2) BERKELEY JOURNAL OF EMPLOYMENT AND LABOR LAW
404, 427-28 (2010); Hila Shamir, What's the Border Got To Do With It: How Immigration
Regimes Affect Familial Care Provision - A Comparative Analysis, 19 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY
JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY AND THE LAW 601, 621-22 (2011).
56 In this context see Sweden's parental leave system with its' monetary incentive to-
wards equal take up of leave: Government of Sweden, GENDER EQUALITY IN SWEDEN, availa-
ble at: https://sweden.se/society/gender-equality-in-sweden/ last accessed Apr. 9, 2018; and
Linda Haas & C. Philip Hwang, The Impact of Taking Parental Leave on Fathers' Participa-
tion In Childcare And Relationships With Children: Lessons from Sweden Community, 11
WORK & FAMILY 85, 85-104 (2008).
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hold care work and can lead either to women's "second shift"57 or to the
outsourcing and commodification of care. 58
Attempts to incentivize a more egalitarian IHDOL aim to promote
gendered equality both in terms of opening labor market opportunities to
both sexes, and as a result, more egalitarian income distribution.59 De-
pending on how coercive the measures are, they may enhance or hinder
autonomy and liberty. A more coercive measure will not let family mem-
bers express their autonomy to choose between household care and mar-
ket work, 60 while too gentle nudging might not be meaningful enough to
enhance the spectrum of choice beyond traditional gender roles and over-
come societal customs. 61 The question of efficiency in this respect is
intensely debated. Gary Becker has suggested that the gendered division
of labor can be explained on efficiency grounds since each spouse's spe-
cialization increases the household production function.62 However, fem-
inist economists have argued that Becker's model is highly simplistic for
a multitude of reasons, chief among them is its essentialist assumption
regarding women's proclivity to care, which disregards market dynamics
and wage inequality and ignores questions of market-based role speciali-
zation via outsourced care.63
E. Which Institution Provides the Service-the State, the Family or
the Market?
While our goal in this framework is to move away from understand-
ing the private public dichotomy as the end-all of policy design, we still
see importance in identifying the institutional structure of service and
57 ARLiE HOCHSCHILD, THE SECOND SHiFT 3-4 (2d ed., 2012).
58 Suzanne M. Bianchi, Melissa A. Milkie, Liana C. Sayer & John P. Robinson, Is Any-
one Doing the Housework? Trends in the Gender Division of Household Labor, 79 SOCIAL
FORCES, 191, 198-99 (2000).
59 Shamir Berkeley Journal of Employment and Labor Law (2010), supra note 55 at 434.
60 E.g., welfare to work programs that require women to enter the labor market as a
condition of social security benefits. See e.g., a discussion of the coercive nature of Welfare to
Work programs in the U.S.: Dorothy E. Roberts, Welfare Reform and Economic Freedom:
Low-Income Mothers' Decisions about Work at Home and in the Market, 44 SANTA CLARA L.
REV. 1029, 1041-59 (2004).
61 E.g., Israel's paternal leave is 15 weeks of paid leave. Mothers are required to take the
first 6 weeks, one week can be taken simultaneously by both parents and the rest can be taken
by either mother or father. The ability to take parental leave-a gentle nudge-barely changed
patterns of parental leave taking in Israel. In 2017 a mere 700 men took parental leave, in
relation to 130,000 women. See: Tali Heruti-Sover, After the Legislation: How Many Men
Chose To Take Parental Leave In 2017? THE MARKER (Dec. 18 2017) available at: https://
www.themarker.com/career/1.4728828 last visited Jan 3 2018.
62 See GARRY BECKER, TREATISE ON THE FAMILY 102-03 (1991).
63 Philomila Tsoukala, Gary Becker, Legal Feminism, and the Costs of Moralizing Care,
16 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 357, 371-73 (2007); Paula England, A Feminist Critique of Ra-
tional-Choice Theories: Implications for Sociology, Am. SOCIOLOGIST 18-20 (1989), and Ann
Mar May, The Feminist Challenge to Economics 6 CHALLENGE (2014), 45, 54-55.
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benefit provision. As mentioned above, provision and administration of
services by different institutions can promote different normative goals.
While the state can assure a certain scope and level of services, state
provision of care services subjects the beneficiaries to the strict, bureau-
cratic and privacy-lacking official realm of the state, while family or
market-provided services often allow for more choice (for some) of the
kind, level and amount of services provided.64 Hence, state provision can
be said to be more capable of promoting equality and overcoming the
coercive nature of the market (as the level of services would not be sub-
ject to recipients' ability to pay), but not necessarily efficiency (as the
state would be less capable of matching the benefits with recipients'
preferences). 65 The market is considered to be better at promoting effi-
ciency and individual choice, but at the cost of increasing commodifica-
tion and coercion. The family is considered better in nurturing inter-
personal relations, but may also maintain traditional intra-household di-
vision of labor.66 However, as mentioned earlier, the state, market and
family are better thought of not as dichotomous institutions but rather as
a spectrum of institutional options that can be mixed and reconfigured as
well as complemented by each other. Different mixes and hybrids are
both common and possible, thus opening new institutional possibilities.
Each of these policy design criteria reflects tensions between the
underlying normative goals, and each represents a distinction between
ideal type mechanisms that can, and we argue that should be, broken up
and understood as a spectrum of modular tools to be mixed and matched
in order to support varying combinations of normative ends. By systemi-
cally analyzing mechanism design decisions along these five criteria, our
framework can potentially uncover a rich and diverse landscape of insti-
tutional possibilities.
In the next section, we use this analytical framework to discuss the
nuanced normative implications of legal regulatory mechanisms in the
context of infant and early childhood care. We believe that the legal in-
frastructure that our analysis produces will open paths for creative and
64 See discussion in Part II supra.
65 ELIZABETH ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETICS AND EcoNoNcs 167 (1993) (the "market
produces and distributes [commodities] with unsurpassed efficiency and in unsurpassed
abundance)."
66 For a discussion of the ideology of the family and the market as distinct spheres in
which the family is a "haven from the anxieties of the modem world" a sphere of altruism and
close (but hierarchical) relations, free from commodifying elements see Frances Olsen, The
Family and the Market: A Study of ldeology and Legal Reform, 96 HARv. L. J. 1497, 1499-08
(1983) For a review of the literature regarding the commodifying effects of the market, see
e.g., DAGAN & FISHER, supra note 22, at 32.
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effective tax and welfare policies, as well as enable more fruitful dia-
logue across disciplines.
IV. FROM NORMATIVE VALUES TO (HYBRID) MECHANISMS-
THE EXAMPLE OF CHILDCARE
In this final section, we seek to show the value of the proposed
analytical framework, focusing on the example of childcare.
There is a wide scope of mechanisms available for the provision of
childcare for parents in general and working mothers in particular. While
the two "extreme" points on this spectrum may indeed be "the public"
(state)-that is governmental provision of free and public childcare, and
"the private" (market)-meaning full reliance on the family and the mar-
ket with no distinct governmental involvement whatsoever; in between
these two extremes, there is a great variety of available options. 67 Our
offered framework seeks to show that a more productive way to think
about policy solution is to relax the crude state v. market dichotomy, and
instead focus on the normative goals and nuanced mechanism design cri-
teria that help to achieve these goals to guide our tax and welfare policy.
Above we suggested five elements in policy design that could be used to
evaluate and design specific tax and welfare policies in more nuanced
ways.
In this section we go back to our initial inquiry into the normative
goals that underlie tax and welfare policies in order to offer a roadmap
for the design of tax and welfare mechanisms, capable of promoting a
complex set of values in the context of childcare. We explain how the
normative underpinnings of autonomy, efficiency and distribution unfold
through the five design mechanisms we identify.
A. Promoting Autonomy in Tax and Welfare Policies
Autonomy requires more than a single-bullet mechanism. Promot-
ing autonomy requires that we offer a variety of options for parents to
choose from, and allow them to freely choose between them-guarantee-
ing the accessibility and affordability of most options. Autonomy also
requires that we treat individuals with equal respect and concern-re-
specting their personhood through the protection of their identity-form-
67 Sweden is an example of a country that provides free public childcare-placing it in the
"public" end of the spectrum. Close to the opposite end we find the United States, which offers
no public childcare. Yet even the United States takes some involvement, by granting low
income families a subsidy to assist with childcare services, as well as tax deductions for child-
care expenses.
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ing resources and the interactions they cherish. 68 Here too, the
dichotomous distinction between "state" and "market" mechanisms is
hardly helpful in designing the mechanisms that would best promote au-
tonomy. Arguably "the state" provides limited choice when forcing par-
ents to consume whatever service it provides and thus fails to promote
autonomy, and "the market" increases choice by providing a variety of
childcare options, but at the price of subjecting parents to another auton-
omy harming component-commodification. Thus, if we are pushed to
choose between "the state" and "the market," we enter a dilemma be-
tween limiting choice on the one hand and commodifying personhood on
the other. We believe the framework we developed above can be a more
useful tool to conceptualize the different policy options available and the
normative goals they can achieve. 69 The challenge is how to take the
virtues of each institution-the state, the market and the family-and
minimize their drawbacks. To illustrate, let us look back at the five
scales.
Selectivity, in its ideal form, empowers those who need it most to be
able to make autonomous choices regarding work, family and child rais-
ing. In a world of scarce resources, it may thus make more sense to chan-
nel resources to those who can benefit from them most. Thus, for
example, assuming we have a budget that can allow a selected few to
gain free childcare or, instead, have the budget allocated universally and
provide small, perhaps even insignificant support to everyone-granting
the benefit selectively would presumably have a greater impact on auton-
omy. Selective benefits however, often have a stigma attached to them,
thus, selectively providing benefits may undermine equal respect, as
those provided with the benefits are also tagged as needy, which could be
humiliating for them, and lead them to under-utilize the benefit.70 Fur-
thermore, selective benefits generally require costly and intrusive income
tests. Finally, selective benefits tend to be less politically stable, since
they generally do not enjoy the support for the middle class. Accord-
ingly, these benefits tend to be more vulnerable to budgetary cuts. 71
The goals should therefore be to target the benefits to increase
choice-making capacity for those who lack it and avoid the stigma asso-
68 Julia S. O'Connor, Gender, Class and Citizenship in the Comparative Analysis of
Welfare State Regimes: Theoretical and Methodological Issues, 44(3) Tim BRITISH JOURNAL
OF SOCIOLOGY 501, 511-14 (1993).
69 For example, in Sweden, although childcare is provided by the state, thereby creating
a presumption that the option will be limited and therefore bad from an autonomy perspective,
in fact we find that it offers a variety of options that ameliorate this aspect: for instance,
childcare centers which operate for different hours than the normal hours, and ones that teach
in minority languages.
70 See Currie & Gahvari, supra note 45, at 347-52.
71 See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
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ciated with it as well as the intrusive and costly bureaucracy. One way to
bypass this dilemma is through the simultaneous use of tax and transfer
policies: provide a universal benefit, but tax individuals progressively.
This empowers the neediest without tagging them, and instead of chan-
neling the benefits to those who need it most, channels their costs to
those who can better afford them.72 Due to its universality, such an ap-
proach might stabilize the level of spending on such benefits, strengthen-
ing access to quality and affordable care not as charity but as a right.73
The in-kind to cash transfer scale offers another nuance: provision
of in-kind benefits could limit parents' choices. It presents parents with a
choice: to use the services provided instead of the childcare of their
choice or to provide childcare themselves. Cash transfers on the other
hand involve the market or the family in the provision of benefits. By
providing parents with cash, we allow them to purchase (or provide
within the family) the childcare they prefer. Market involvement is a
mixed blessing. On the one hand, the market allows for a plurality of
alternatives in the provision of childcare services to evolve. The market
would-ideally-offer a great variety of childcare services to match par-
ents' preferences, and unlike in-kind services, the money parents receive
could be used for other purposes should they choose to care for their
children themselves.74 On the other hand, however, along with the ad-
vantages of the market in the provision and consumption of goods and
services, the market also entails two major drawbacks.
72 Such an example can be found in Sweden, where all parents have the option of send-
ing their children to almost-completely subsidized childcare facilities (at a minor differing
price), however taxes are collected in relation to the amount of earnings. See: Anita Nyberg,
Nyberg, Gender Equality Policy In Sweden: 1970s-2010s, 2(4) NORDIC JoURNAIL OF WORKING
LIFE STUDIES 67-84 (2012).
73 JULIA S. O'CONNOR, ANN SHOLA ORLOFF, SHEILA SHAVER, STATES, MARKETS, FAMI-
LIES: GENDER, LIBERALISM AND SOCIAL POLICY IN AUSTRALIA, CANADA, GREAT BRITAIN AND
THE UNITED STATES 223-30 (1999); ARNLAUG LEA, WELFARE STATES AND WORKING
MOTHERS 120-26 (1992).
74 The hybrid nature of the Netherlands' welfare policy is reflected in the array of differ-
ent childcare options that parents can choose from. As a baseline, to ensure quality and safety,
all care providers-public or private-that receive government funding or subsidies must meet
strict regulatory standards. Furthermore, different types of care providers are funded and sup-
ported by the government in different ways, leading to myriad care solutions for parents of
young children. The options include: day care centers (either for-profit or nonprofit), which
offer a traditional "preschool" scheme and to meet the needs of working parents; "private"
childminders that look after a maximum of six children, and could well be family members of
the children; after-school care which is relevant for school-age children; and flexible options
such as playgroups and babysitters. However, the policy subsidies are not extended to parents
who care for their own children and are even conditioned on the parents' employment. See:
Trudie Knijn & Jane Lewis, ECEC: Childcare Markets in the Netherlands and England, in
PUBLIC OR PRIVATE GOODS? 154-62 (Brigitte Unger, Daan Van der Linde & Michael Getzner
eds., 2017).
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The first drawback is the coercive power of the market. When the
cash available (or transferred) for the purchase of services is limited,
people might be coerced to either select substandard services or give
them up altogether (and make alternative use of the funds they receive).
Again, thinking creatively along the in-kind to cash transfer scale can
offer nuanced solutions. One possible solution to avoid this coercive na-
ture of the market is through a voucher system that preserves market
advantages in the provision of a variety of services without limiting them
to parents' ability-to-pay in selecting among these services.
The second drawback of the market is the commodificatory aspect
of market interaction. By providing cash benefits, the state pushes par-
ents to seek market solutions, thus commodifying care by putting a price
tag on a personal and intimate relationship, and discouraging the non-
commodified option of care.
The question of who provides the services helps us consider this
problem. It is true that the market commodifies childcare. By paying for
childcare and by treating care as a commodity, the market reduces the
human interaction to a transaction. But the provision of in-kind services
by the state is not necessarily less commodifying, as the "one size fits
all" nature of governmentally provided services may be even more com-
modifying in terms of objectifying and standardizing care. 75
But the question of who provides the benefit helps us understand
that cash-transfer is not necessarily limited to market-provided services.
Instead, money can also be used to support intra-household care for chil-
dren (e.g., as a subsidy for stay-at-home parents). When a subsidy is paid
for parents to take care of their own children it seems less commodifying
than the alternative. True, money is paid and childcare is provided. But
the money is actually paid in order to buy the parent out of the job mar-
ket and free a parent to take care of her child. 76 Thus, cash transfers may
increase the choices available to parents not only with regard to the kind
and level of market provided childcare, but also it allows them to choose
to keep childcare as a non-market interaction.
Finally, intra-household division of labor provides one last perspec-
tive on childcare and autonomy. Although family provision of childcare
may tilt IHDOL against women, providing a subsidy for market provided
care only may equally curtail their autonomy when they prefer to stay at
75 See DAGAN & FISHER, supra note 22, at 32.
76 Such an example can be seen in parents' option in Sweden to reduce their working
hours by up to twenty-five percent until their child reaches the age of eight. See: Anne Gron-
lund and Jana Javomik, Great Expectations-Dual-earner Policies and the Management of
Work-Family Conflict: The Examples of Sweden and Slovenia, 3 FAMILIES, RELATIONSHPS
AND SocETiEs 51, 54-55 (2014).
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home.77 Thus one way to think about IHDOL is to provide at-home sub-
sidy for childcare only when fathers take part in home caring for chil-
dren. Or-better yet-to let the parents choose whom stays at home but
provide an increased subsidy when the father is the one choosing to stay
at home in order to nudge parents to overcome traditional gendered divi-
sion of labor.
Thus, from the perspective of autonomy, a nuanced mechanism
emerges as promoting autonomy-way beyond "state" and "market."
Such mechanisms might, for example, include universal provision of
(generous enough) vouchers that are balanced with progressive taxation,
provided that such vouchers could be used for any of the following: mar-
ket provided childcare, state provided care or non-market provision of
services within the family in case fathers too take part in childcare. 78
B. Promoting Efficiency in Tax and Welfare Policies
Efficiency, in our context, implies the provision of the greatest vari-
ety and best quality childcare to fit the plurality of parent's preferences,
with the lowest costs.
Who provides childcare services? In standard discussions of the pri-
vate-public type, the state is often said to be inefficient in the provision
of services (childcare included), thus leading to the seemingly inevitable
conclusion that market provision of such services must prevail, at least
from an efficiency perspective. 79 "The state" however, is not necessarily
inefficient in the provision of services. 80 Although it is true that the cen-
tralized nature of the state ordinarily lacks the competitive incentives to
provide efficient services and to cater to consumers' preferences (things
that the market is supposed to achieve better), the state may not necessa-
rily lack competition, and the market can suffer from market failures
77 One way to align such subsidy with the actual preferences of mothers is to allow for a
secondary market in such vouchers, allowing women who prefer to stay at home to sell their
voucher to women who require more (or more hours of) childcare services. See DAGAN &
FISHER, supra note 22, at 115.
78 A partial example of this can be seen in the Netherlands' childcare system. Parents are
provided a subsidy that can be used for a vast variety of childcare options, although these are
limited to non-parental care. The Canadian child benefit system, however, is designed to en-
able parents to choose more freely between a breadwinner and a dual earners model, providing
benefits to parental care as well, irrespective of the parents' participation in the paid labor
market. For a description of the Netherlands see PUBLIC OR PRIVATE GOODS? Supra note 75;
for a description of the Canadian system see Rianne Mahon, Christina Bergqvist & Deborah
Brennan, Social Policy Change: Work-family Tensions in Sweden, Australia and Canada, 50
Soc. POL. & ADM. 165, 176 (2016).
79 For a critique of this position see: JANE JENSON & MARIETrE SINEAU, WHO CARES?:
WOMEN'S WORK, CHILDCARE, AND WELFARE STATE REDESIGN 37-42 (2001).
80 Minow, supra note 21, at 6-10.
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(e.g., externalities and lack of information).81 Moreover, the market fo-
cuses on a single currency-utility (or its proxy, money). But when peo-
ple seek to promote other (or additional) "currencies" such as affection, a
sense of security or intellectual stimulation, the market incentives are not
necessarily designed to promote such goals most efficiently.
A possible solution for the lack of competition of state provided
care is to have multiple state and market institutions provide childcare
and have them compete for "clients." Regulation can, in other words,
unbundle the provision of services from its financial source. The state
can offer in-kind services that would compete with market-provided ser-
vices, and-at the same time-subsidize parents' choice of either one.
82
This could be done through a voucher or cash transfer system and the
state could set prices for its services. 83 Of course such a system can only
work if the public system is well funded and can provide real competi-
tion to the private system. The baseline of quality of all alternative needs
to be set by regulation that ensures some quality control of all providers
and sufficient funding to public schools. Alternatively, incentives to con-
struct childcare facilities could also be an effective option.84 State provi-
sion of in-kind childcare services as an alternative, or regulatory
supervision of the services provided by the market, could further reduce
externalities (imposed, for example, on children), and make the system
81 Christos Pitelis & Thmoas Clarke, Introduction: The Political Economy of Privatiza-
tion, in THE PoLITICAL ECONOMY OF PRIVATIZATION (Christos Pitelis & Thmoas Clarke eds.)
1-5 (2005); Jonas Prager, Market Failure and Public Sector Failure: Is Privatization a Pan-
acea? EconPapers (Working Papers from C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, NYU)
(1990); William L. Megginson & Jeffry M. Netter, From State to Market: A Survey of Empiri-
cal Studies on Privatization 39(2) JouRNAL OF ECONOMIC LITERATURE 321-89 (2001).
82 For example. In Sweden along with the generous, high-quality state-run pre-schools,
parents may also send their children to charter schools (regulated private schools) and receive
a considerable tax credit on the amount paid. See Daniel Beland, Paula Blomqvist, Jorgen
Goul Andersen, Joakim Palme & Alex Waddan, The Universal Decline of Universality? Social
Policy Change in Canada, Denmark, Sweden and the UK, 48 SoC. POL. & ADM. 739, 749
(2014). See also the discussion of the Netherlands' system see supra note 75.
83 This could be facilitated in part by child benefits. Child benefit is a universal benefit
provided in many welfare states to families with children. Such a benefit can be found, for
example, in: Canada, Israel and Sweden. In Canada and Israel an additional differentiated
benefit is given to low-income families. The benefit's effectiveness in practice depends on
whether the sum granted is, in fact, substantial enough to cover for a significant part of the
costs of childcare. See id. at pp. 748, 750. For Israel see Social Security Institute, CniLDREN
BENEFITS-GENERAL INFORMATION available at: https://www.btl.gov.il/English%20Home
page/Benefits/Children/Pages/default.aspx last accessed Apr. 9, 2018.
84 This option seems to be gaining more prevalence in recent years. England grants tax
exemptions for childcare services given by the employer or by a childcare provider with whom
the employer has an arrangement for his employees, granted that the arrangement is super-
vised. In the Netherlands too, there is a growing number of "company places" due to "stimulus
measures." Sweden too has a growing number of private non-corporate childcare institutions,
despite its generous heavily state-subsidized childcare options. See supra note 83 at
pp.747-49.
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more transparent-thus reducing market failures. 85 Importantly, the vari-
ety of services should include not only a plurality of market and state
provided childcare options, but also an equally plausible in-house provi-
sion of (either hired or self-provided) childcare that may be preferred by
some parents.
The bottom line is that from the efficiency perspective there are
more options than the complete marketization of childcare that can
achieve efficient provision of childcare and parents' participation in the
workplace. The provision of multiple options by the state, the market and
the family for taxpayers to choose from, guaranteeing a certain baseline
that all providers comply with, and allowing for competition among the
options for public funds (by way of a voucher system, 86 or cash trans-
fers), could provide for such an efficient system. Regulation may be re-
quired in order to curtail market failures such as lack of information and
externalities. Some elements are key in creating such a system. First, the
existence of a public system that provides services at a level can be at-
tractive to the middle classes. Accordingly, sufficient governmental
funding to the public option, independent of vouchers, has to be a part of
such a policy in order to guarantee the public system in not drained of
resources and can offer a competitive alternative to private options. 87
Second, private school pricing and admissions criteria require regulation
in order to limit the social inequities associated with voucher schemes.88
In addition, in order to encourage women's labor market participation
some form of care subsidy (e.g., subsidization of tax benefits) can be
significant in assisting families to cover the cost of care. By introducing
such regulation, individual households will more easily decide to opt for
non-parental care thus freeing parents to pursue paid employment. This
can allow mothers and fathers to efficiently select their employment as
well as childcare options.
85 Canada, for example, regulates a substantial portion of childcare facilities. The
Netherlands grants higher funding and subsidies to families who send their children to state
supervised childcare facilities. For a description of the system in Canada see Martha Friendly,
Taking Canada's Child Care Pulse: The State of ECEC in 2015, in MOVING BEYOND BABY
STEPS: BUILDING A CHILD CARE PLAN FOR CANADIAN FAMILIES: 24 OUR SCHOOLS, OUR-
SELVES 9-24, 11-14. For the Netherlands see PUBLIC OR PRIVATE GOODS? supra note 75.
86 For an in depth discussion of the voucher system in education in the U.S. see: THOMAS
L. GOOD AND JENNIFER S. BRADEN, THE GREAT SCHOOL DEBATE: CHOICE, VOUCHERS, AND
CHARTERS (2014); for a critical take on school vouchers, Helen F. Ladd, School Vouchers: A
Critical View, 16 THE JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES 3 (2002). For discussion of suc-
cessful voucher programs and the importance of sufficient public funding for public options
see: Jim Carl, Parental Choice as National Policy in England and the United States, 38(3)
COMPARATIVE EDUCATION REvIEw 294 (1994).
87 SCHOOL CHOICE AND SCHOOL VOUCHERS: AN OECD PERSPECTIVE 6-13 (2017) avail-
able at http://www.oecd.org/edu/School-choice-and-school-vouchers-anOECD-perspective
.pdf last visited Apr. 9, 2018.
88 Id.
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C. Promoting Distributive Justice in Tax and Welfare Policies
On the face of it, it may seem as if selectivity is the most progres-
sive choice amongst tax and welfare policies. In theory when only the
people who require assistance actually get it, most public funds are
targeted at the most needy segments of society, hence maximizing distri-
bution. This assumption, however disregards the political dimension of
the welfare state. In fact, more political stable universal arrangements
can reach similar distribution, as explained above, by a combination of
higher progressive taxes (or otherwise creatively progressive tax benefits
such as the U.S. progressive tax credit for childcare) and universal distri-
bution of benefits.
Moreover, since allocation of public benefits distributes more than
simply economic resources, we should take a wider angle at its effects.
Thus, allocation of welfare benefits often distributes not only money but
also dignity and respect. 89 Hence, when public funds and services are
tagged as benefits for the poor, they carry with them a stigma that may
be translated into unequal social treatment, and at times, humiliating
treatment. Furthermore, selective benefits may be more vulnerable in the
political process-as the majority (not entitled to such benefits) may be
quick to curtail them.
The allocation of public benefits could also (re)distribute other re-
sources such as gender equality via IHDOL. By encouraging fathers to
take an equal part in childcare (e.g., through designated post-natal leaves,
longer daycare hours that allow them to equally share child pick-up, or
by supporting working mothers in their choice to work outside the house
through extra benefits), the tax and welfare system could take part in the
distribution of time, leisure, money and power within the family, and
hence within society as a whole.90
CONCLUSION
This Article argues for the benefits of expanding our institutional
imagination beyond the public-private dichotomy, in order to envision a
more nuanced understanding of the mechanisms that make up tax and
welfare policies that seek to promote gender equality in the labor market
and the household. In demonstrating this, it focuses on the provision of
childcare.
89 See Elizabeth S. Anderson, What Is the Point of Equality, 109 ETHIcs 287, 306 (1999).
90 Perhaps the most prominent example is the intricate yet effective bonus system in
Sweden. The Swedish post-natal leave system, is renowned for its effects on IHDOL, in addi-
tion to childcare facilities which are active during flexible hours that are meant to facilitate
parents' working hours. See Government of Sweden, GENDER EQUALITY IN SWEDEN, supra
note 56.
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Traditional views see distribution as best achieved via a central
state-based system that allocates benefits to all citizens, with special re-
sources dedicated to the most needy parts of society. Our analysis calls
for a more nuanced understanding of distribution. We argue that a wider
perspective of distributive justice requires taking into account not only
economic equality but also gender equality, capabilities and dignity. As a
result, we find that a mix of state and market-provided benefits; a mix of
universal benefits supplemented by targeted benefits and progressive tax-
ation; establishing in-kind services that do not suppress experimentation
and competition but rather nourish it; and using the tax system to offset
the regressive characteristics of universal benefits, when combined, can
lead us to better distributive outcomes than the either/or traditional
views.
The five-pronged framework developed and applied in this Article,
and its connection to normative goals, sought to expose the trade-offs
embedded in given policies and the complexity of the interaction of legal
regulation with market and social realities. The distributive framework
can hopefully function as a vocabulary with which to argue about the
effects of social policy in relation to the regulation of markets of care and
beyond without reducing all reforms merely to the institution that pro-
vides them-private or public. By emphasizing the multilayered effects
of legal regulation and the multitude of policy design options in the con-
text of childcare, the analytical framework offered provides a lens
through which people can identify the inter-related-at times conflicting
and at others reinforcing-effects of policy design on autonomy, effi-
ciency and distributive justice.
We hope that this analysis can open new productive ways to think
and talk about law and public policy that seek to promote more and bet-
ter choices for women and men at home and at work. We also hope that
this analysis can show that when thinking about innovative welfare and
tax policy, we should not assume a unified view of what the market and
the state are or of what they do. Using the five mechanism design crite-
ria, we show that neither the state nor the market mean one thing. Both
are parts of a multifaceted landscape of private and public actors, shaping
a variety of-mostly hybrid-institutions and mechanisms that interact
to provide, finance and regulate childcare. The details of this institutional
and regulatory landscape, rather than the crude label as private or public,
are what could, potentially, enhance efficiency, reinforce our autonomy
and support distributive justice among us.
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